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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
  
                            ----------  
  
GARTH, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Danny Bass appeals the 37 month sentence imposed by the 
district court under the 1989 version of the Sentencing 
Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 2K2.2) following his plea of 
guilty to charges of conspiracy to purchase and transport 
firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(a)(5)-(6).  Bass argues that the district court erred in 
three respects:  (1) that the court clearly erred in finding that 
he was a "leader or organizer" as defined in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1; 
(2) that the court impermissibly departed upward four levels when 
it held that Bass "should have been possessed of knowledge or had 
reason to believe that they [the weapons Bass purchased] would be 
utilized to commit other types of felony crimes," app. 123; and 
(3) that the court violated the Fifth Amendment's due process 
clause by sentencing him at the top of the sentencing range based 
on the court's belief that Bass perjured himself. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3551.  We have appellate jurisdiction over the resulting 
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 We find no merit in Bass' first and third challenges to 
his sentence and thus will affirm those aspects of the court's 
determination with only a brief discussion.  Nonetheless, we 
conclude that the 1989 version of U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 2K2.2 
already took into account the foreseeable criminal use of the 
weapons sold in the conspiracy.  Because the guidelines do not 
permit an upward departure on this basis, we will vacate the 




 From late 1989 to October 1990, Danny Bass conspired 
with Milton Lodge, Sam Gilbert, Katrina Huskersen, Tim Crumm, and 
James Reid to buy firearms in Richmond, Virginia and to transport 
the guns for undocumented resale in Newark, New Jersey.  The 
conspirators performed various functions in this plan, including 
the solicitation of straw buyers in Virginia, the transfer of 
funds from New Jersey to Virginia to pay for the purchases, the 
purchase and transportation of at least 81 guns to Newark, New 
Jersey, and the subsequent sale of the guns in the Newark area.  
The weapons sold in the course of the conspiracy included an 
undisclosed number of automatic firearms such as "Tec-9s."  App. 
54.   
 While the government presented no evidence that Bass 
purchased, transported, or sold firearms himself, the government 
produced evidence that Bass worked with Lodge and Gilbert to 
organize the New Jersey operation and that Bass assisted in the 
Virginia operation.  For example, Lodge testified that on at 
least two occasions he either delivered guns to Bass or notified 
Bass of the delivery of weapons in New Jersey.  App. 82-84; 77-
80.  By means of various wire transfers and personal 
transactions, Bass provided approximately $4,300 to $4,600 to 
Gilbert for the purpose of purchasing weapons in Virginia.  App. 
61-66.  A government expert testified that this amount of money 
would purchase approximately 50 semiautomatic handguns in 
Virginia.  App. 62.  The record suggests that other monetary 
transfers occurred but the amounts transferred were not known.   
 Grand jury testimony of Katrina Huskerson, a straw 
buyer in Virginia, was submitted at the sentencing hearing.  In 
addition to other testimony, Huskerson testified that Bass and 
Sam Gilbert purchased the most firearms during the conspiracy.  
App. 199. 
 On October 21, 1993, the United States indicted Danny 
Bass and Samuel Gilbert for conspiring to purchase firearms 
illegally and to transport them in interstate commerce in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5)-(6).  Bass 
pled guilty to the conspiracy on the condition that the 
government not seek a two level upward adjustment for obstruction 
of justice. 
 At sentencing, the district court calculated Bass' base 
offense level as six under the 1989 version U.S.S.G § 2K2.1.  The 
court adjusted the sentence upward six levels based on the number 
of guns involved in the conspiracy.  The court adjusted the 
sentence downward two levels for acceptance of responsibility.  
 After a hearing, the district court found that Bass had 
bankrolled a substantial part of the conspiracy's firearm 
purchases and/or other expenses and directed a significant 
portion of the conspiracy's New Jersey operations.  The court 
thus found that Bass was a leader or organizer within the meaning 
of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and adjusted the sentence upward an 
additional four levels.   
 The district court departed upward still another four 
levels because Bass "should have been possessed of knowledge or 
had reason to believe that [the guns] would be utilized to commit 
other types of felony crimes."  App. 123.  The court based this 
decision to depart upward on two factors.  First, the court felt 
that the type of weapons sold in the conspiracy were "the favored 
weapons of the underworld."  App. 119.  Second, the court 
believed that the 1991 amendments to the guidelines, which now 
permit a four level adjustment in the offense level when "the 
defendant . . . possessed or transferred any firearm . . . with 
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or 
possessed in connection with another felony offense . . .," 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (1994), demonstrated that the 1989 
guidelines did not take into account Bass' knowledge of the 
possible illegal uses of the firearms.  The district court also 
noted that weapons attributable to the conspiracy had been linked 
to a police shootout and the murder of a New Jersey assistant 
district attorney. 
 Finally, the district court chose to sentence Bass at 
the top of the applicable sentencing range because the court 
found that Bass had perjured himself at an earlier suppression 
hearing. 
 Following these adjustments, the district court, having 
a range of 30-37 months from which it could sentence Bass, then 
sentenced Bass to 37 months in prison and three years supervised 
release.  Bass filed a timely notice of appeal. 
  
 II 
 Bass argues that the district court clearly erred when 
it found that he was a leader or organizer of the conspiracy.  We 
will not disturb the factual findings of the district court 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  United States v. Ortiz, 878 
F.2d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1989).  We must accept the district 
court's findings unless we are "left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed."  United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) instructs the district court to 
increase a defendant's sentence by four levels "[i]f the 
defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that 
involved five or more participants . . . ."  Application Note 
three of the 1989 guidelines instructs the court to consider the 
following factors in deciding whether the defendant is an 
organizer:  the defendant's decision-making authority, the nature 
of the participation in the actual offenses, the recruitment of 
accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the proceeds, 
the degree of planning, the nature and scope of the illegal 
activity, and the degree of control exercised over others.  
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, App. Note 3; Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127.  The 
commentary to the guidelines purports only to suggest various 
factors the court should consider.  Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127.  
Evidence of every factor is not a prerequisite to a finding that 
the defendant is a leader or organizer under § 3B1.1, nor is 
evidence that the defendant is the sole or predominate leader 
required.  Id.  The government need only show sufficient 
authority to justify such a finding.  Id. 
 Bass premises his challenge primarily on the 
government's lack of evidence that he actually participated in 
the purchase, transportation, and sale of the firearms.  Bass 
misunderstands the indicia of leadership under the guidelines.  
Leadership is not inconsistent with a refusal to participate in 
the actual implementation of a criminal plan.  A person who 
plans, funds, and supervises a conspiracy's operation does not 
immunize himself from upward adjustment under § 3B1.1 just 
because he does not join in all of the mechanics and all of the 
various activities of the illegal enterprise.  Indeed, leaders 
and organizers often distance themselves from the actual 
implementation of the conspiracy. 
 The fundamental question is whether adequate evidence 
supports the district court's determination that Bass 
participated in planning and organizing the crime.  This record 
provides sufficient support for that conclusion. 
 The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing 
revealed that Bass bankrolled a large part of the gun purchasing 
operation.  His contribution of approximately $4,300 to $4,600 
was sufficient to account for the purchase of more than half of 
the weapons eventually traced to the conspiracy.  Bass took 
possession of some of these weapons immediately when he was in 
Virginia.  In at least two other cases, he assumed control over 
weapons shipments upon their arrival in Newark.  Further, Bass 
admitted to identifying buyers for the weapons in New Jersey.  
This evidence, which provides a sufficient foundation to conclude 
that Bass had substantial control over the conspiracy's New 
Jersey operations, permitted the district court to find that Bass 
was a leader or organizer within the meaning of § 3B1.1. 
 
 III 
 Bass next argues that the Sentencing Commission 
adequately considered the foreseeable consequence that firearms 
sold in violation of the National Firearms Act would be used in 
the commission of other felonies when it drafted the 1989 version 
of guideline § 2K2.2.1  He argues that the district court 
                     
1
.  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1), under which Bass was sentenced, 
required the district court to calculate a defendant's sentence 
by reference to § 2K2.2.  The 1989 version of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.2 
reads as follows: 
 
 Unlawful Trafficking and Other Prohibited Transactions 
Involving Firearms 
 
 (a)  Base Offense Level 
 
  (1) 16, if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(o) or 26 U.S.C. § 5861; 
 
  (2)  6, otherwise. 
 
 (b)  Specific Offense Characteristics 
 
  (1) If the offense involved distribution of a firearm, 
or possession with intent to distribute, and the 
number of firearms unlawfully distributed, or to 
be distributed, exceeded two, increase as follows: 
 
   Number of Firearms Increase in Level 
 
                     . . .                    . . .  
therefore erred by departing upward an additional four levels in 
his case.  Whether the Sentencing Commission adequately 
considered a factor in drafting a guideline is subject to plenary 
review.  United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 The district court must sentence within the applicable 
guideline range and is not authorized to depart from that range 
"unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence 
different from that described."  18 U.S.C § 3553(b).  "In 
determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into 
(..continued) 
 
   (F)     50 or more       add 6 
 
  (2) If any of the firearms was stolen or had an 
altered or obliterated serial number, increase by 
2 levels. 
 
  (3) If more than one of the following applies, use the 
greater: 
 
   (A) If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(d), increase by 6 levels; or 
 
   (B) If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(b)(1) or (b)(2), increase by 1 level. 
 
 (c) Cross Reference 
 
  (1) If the defendant, at the time of the offense, had 
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, 
apply § 2K2.1 (Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or 
Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition) if the 
resulting offense level is greater than that 
determined above. 
consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing 
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the 
Sentencing Commission."  Id.  Here, the district court departed 
upward four levels because it held that the 1989 firearm 
guidelines, specifically U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1 and 2K2.2, "did not 
take into account the nature and the type of weapons transferred.  
One should have been possessed of knowledge or had reason to 
believe that they would be utilized to commit other types of 
felonies."  App. 123. 
 The district court's conclusion conflicts with the 
analysis in two of our earlier opinions: United States v. Uca, 
867 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1989) and United States v. Kikumura, 
918 F.2d 1084, 1104-07 (3d Cir. 1990).   
 In Uca, Uca and a co-defendant Hodzic attempted to 
purchase guns from a government sting operation in Pennsylvania 
for eventual resale and shipment to Albania for use in a private 
war.  Following their convictions, the district court departed 
upward on the following grounds: 
 There's no lawful purpose for these guns.  
We're not talking about one gun or two guns, 
we're talking about 56 untraceable handguns 
which translates in my mind to at least 56 
potential acts of violence in this country or 
in another country.  The use of handguns, 
unlicensed handguns, causes the perpetuation 
of criminal activity of persons so inclined 
to rob, maim, start their own private wars, 
even drug wars in cities such as 
Philadelphia.   
 
Id. at 786.  After examining the purpose and substance of 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.3,2 we determined that "[c]learly, the Guidelines 
contemplate unlawful intent" on the part of the defendants 
transferring the firearms.  Id. at 789.  Because the guideline 
took into account the likelihood that illegally obtained handguns 
would be used in future crimes, we concluded that "[t]he intended 
use of the guns is not a circumstance warranting upward 
departure."  Id. at 790 (footnote omitted). 
 Kikumura involved the application of the firearms and 
explosives guidelines to a defendant, Yu Kikumura, who was caught 
with bombs which he had intended to use in a terrorist attack in 
New York City.  The type of bomb seized would without question 
have resulted in death or serious injury to the public.  Because 
the district court concluded that the guidelines did not account 
for Kikumura's specific intent to murder civilians, the district 
court departed upward.  Kikumura claimed that Uca invalidated the 
departure.  We distinguished Uca and disagreed. 
 In Kikumura, we read Uca as holding that the offense 
levels provided in the Sentencing Guidelines already accounted 
for a defendant's disregard for the likelihood that firearms 
involved in a conviction would be used in later criminal 
offenses.  Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1109.  Nonetheless, we concluded 
that neither Uca nor the guidelines accounted for the kind of 
                     
2
.  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.3, the guideline applied in Uca, was a 
predecessor to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and § 2K2.2, the guidelines 
applied here.  The substance of the two guidelines is nearly 
identical.  The minor differences that exist have no effect on 
this case. 
specific intent to kill which Kikumura had shown.  Id.  To 
summarize, we decided that the guidelines' "base offense levels 
incorporate some presumption of intended unlawful use," but not a 
predetermined specific intent to kill.  918 F.2d at 1109. 
 In the present case, neither the district court nor the 
government identified any evidence which suggested that Bass knew 
of, or intended, any particular illegal uses for the weapons sold 
in the course of the conspiracy.  The district court departed 
upwards because Bass should have known that the guns would be 
used in future felonies.   
 The district court based its conclusion primarily on 
the fact that an undisclosed number of semiautomatic handguns and 
"Tec-9s" -- "the favored weapons of the underworld" -- were among 
the firearms sold in the conspiracy.  App. 119.  While we can 
understand the district court's concern that these types of 
weapons are generally used for unlawful purposes, we do not 
believe that the mere identification of the type of weapons 
purchased and transported indicate that Bass' level of intent 
exceeded the mens rea present in Uca, which we found to have been 
adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission.   
 As additional support for its upward departure, the 
district court recognized that weapons attributable to the 
conspiracy had already been tied to other felonies in Newark.  
Newark police found at least one weapon, attributable to Bass, 
following a shootout between police and drug dealers, and another 
weapon, also attributable to Bass, was used to kill a New Jersey 
assistant district attorney.  The government however was unable 
to show that Bass was in any way aware of these events or was 
associated with those who perpetrated the crimes.   
 We recognize that an analytical distinction exists 
between Bass' mens rea with respect to possible future felonies 
and the actual commission of those felonies.  The propriety of an 
upward departure based on the actual commission of felonies using 
guns purchased during the conspiracy was not considered in Uca as 
no evidence of actual subsequent offenses was presented to the 
sentencing court.  Nonetheless, this distinction is too tenuous 
to conclude that the sentencing guidelines permit a departure 
where a later gun-related felony is actually committed and 
preclude a departure in a Uca situation when no evidence of a 
later felony is considered by the district court.  Hence, we will 
not interpret the 1989 guidelines as permitting a departure 
because felonies were ultimately committed while, at the same 
time, forbidding a departure because the defendant had reason to 
believe the guns would be used in the commission of future 
felonies. 
 Absent additional evidence of specific intent tying 
Bass more directly to the subsequent crimes, these tragic events 
only confirm the reality already taken into account by the 
Sentencing Commission's 1989 firearm guidelines -- that the 
illegal sale of guns always poses the risk that the guns will be 
used in other dangerous illegal activity. 
 The government sought to avoid our holding in Uca by 
reference to the Sentencing Commission's 1991 amendments to the 
firearms guidelines.  In 1991, the Commission added U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) which reads: 
 If the defendant used or possessed any 
firearm or ammunition in connection with 
another felony offense; or possessed or 
transferred any firearm or ammunition with 
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that 
it would be used or possessed in connection 
with another felony offense, increase by 4 
levels. 
 
(emphasis added).  This provision might have permitted a four 
level adjustment if the court could have applied these later 
guidelines. 
 The government argues that the 1991 amendments permit 
us to affirm Bass' sentence on the basis of United States v. 
Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992).  Joshua, under certain 
circumstances, permits courts in this Circuit to consider 
subsequent amendments to official guidelines commentary when 
interpreting prior guidelines, even if the new commentary 
conflicts with a panel's decision rendered prior to the 
amendment.  Id. at 854-56. 
 The government's argument however is unavailing because 
the 1991 amendment does not conflict with our conclusion in Uca 
and Kikumura that the guidelines under which those cases were 
decided presume some level of illegal use for the firearms 
transferred. 
   The 1991 amendments involved more than a reexamination 
of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.  The amendments represented the Commission's 
efforts to consolidate U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1, 2K2.2, and 2K2.3 into a 
single guideline, § 2K2.1.  Section 2K2.3 in the 1989 guidelines, 
which was titled "Receiving, Transporting, Shipping or 
Transferring a Firearm or Ammunition With Intent to Commit 
Another Offense or With Knowledge that It Will Be Used in 
Committing Another Offense," sought to tailor a defendant's 
sentence to any known or intended uses of firearms.  This 
guideline also applied to illegal transactions in firearms when, 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(b), the defendant had "reasonable cause to 
believe that [a felony] is to be committed therewith."  See 
Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.3 (1989).   
 An even earlier version of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.3 also took 
into account the defendant's knowledge or intent regarding the 
use of the weapons in future offenses.  Section 2K2.3(c)(1) of 
the pre-1989 guideline read as follows: 
 If the defendant provided the firearm to 
another for the purpose of committing another 
offense, or knowing that he planned to use it 
in committing another offense, apply § 2X1.1 
(Attempt or Conspiracy) in respect to such 
other offense, if the resulting offense level 
is higher. 
As this pre-1989 guideline language makes clear, the Commission 
contemplated the imposition of higher sentences when the 
defendant transferred firearms with intent or knowledge that they 
would later be used in other offenses.  Both versions of § 2K2.3 
thus reveal that the Sentencing Commission specifically 
considered the defendant's mens rea in setting the appropriate 
offense level. 
 The new § 2K2.1(b)(5) provision, rather than altering 
the substance of the 1989 version of § 2K2.1, continues a part of 
the function that § 2K2.3 served in 1989.  As a result, the 
amendment does not by itself support a conclusion that the 
Commission, in drafting the 1989 guidelines, failed to consider 
the foreseeable illegal use of illegally obtained weapons.   
 Further, the instant case lacks some of the crucial 
factors, present in Joshua, factors that persuaded us to 
reevaluate our prior interpretation of the applicable guideline 
in light of the subsequent amendment.   
 Joshua involved a Sentencing Commission amendment which 
explicitly sought to clarify ambiguous, but unchanged guideline 
language by means of new commentary.  976 F.2d at 855.  Here, 
neither party has pointed to anything which suggests why the 
Commission sought to add § 2K2.1(b)(5) to the substance of the 
guideline.  In the absence of any language, provision or 
explanation which clarifies the Commission's intent when it added 
the "reason to believe" language in § 2K2.1(b)(5), we cannot know 
the thinking that gave rise to the amendment.  It may be that the 
amendment indicates that the Commission had not previously 
considered the question of the defendant's recklessness with 
respect to future crimes or it may be that the Commission simply 
changed the degree of punishment for a previously considered 
factor just as it did when it increased the base offense levels 
applied to some firearm offenses as a part of the 1991 
amendments.  Compare U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a) & 2K2.2(a) (1989) with 
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a) (1992).  Absent a clear intent on the part of 
the Commission to clarify a prior ambiguity and absent the type 
of clear conflict between our precedents and new Commission 
action, which we discussed in Joshua, we have no occasion to 
reconsider our holding in Uca and our discussion of that holding 
in Kikumura. 
 For all of these reasons, we disagree with the 
government's argument that the Commission's 1991 amendment 
provides sufficient reason to reevaluate our controlling opinions 
in Uca and Kikumura, which we are duty bound to apply.  See Third 
Circuit I.O.P. 9.1.  Because the district court's departure 




 Finally, Bass argues that the district court violated 
his constitutional right to due process by sentencing him at the 
highest end of the sentencing range based on the district court's 
finding that Bass had perjured himself in a prior exclusionary 
hearing.  We exercise plenary review over Bass' constitutional 
due process challenge, United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 
222 (3d Cir. 1992), and conclude, as we have earlier noted, that 
Bass' argument lacks merit.   
 Recently, in United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 
(1992), the Supreme Court held that enhancement of a guidelines 
sentence for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based 
on a district court's finding that the defendant perjured himself 
did not violate the Constitution.  The Court wrote: 
 In the present context, . . . the enhancement 
provision is part of a sentencing scheme 
designed to determine the appropriate type 
and extent of punishment after the issue of 
guilt has been resolved.  The commission of 
perjury is of obvious relevance in this 
regard, because it reflects on a defendant's 
criminal history, on her willingness to 
accept the commands of the law and the 
authority of the court, and on her character 
in general. 
Id. at 1116.  Accordingly, a finding of perjury can enhance a 
defendant's offense level in some contexts.   
 The Court in Dunnigan relied heavily on its opinion in 
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).  There, the Court 
held that increasing a pre-guidelines sentence following a 
finding of perjury did not violate the due process clause.  The 
Court concluded that the risk that sentencing judges would 
improperly enhance sentences based on an unindicted offense did 
not outweigh the benefits of allowing the judge to consider all 
of the defendant's conduct when fashioning an appropriate 
sentence.  Id. at 53-54. 
 While Bass' challenge is not controlled by either 
Dunnigan or Grayson, we are satisfied that the reasoning of both 
cases permits a district court to impose a higher sentence within 
the sentencing range on the basis of the defendant's perjury.  If 
the district court can enhance the offense level based on a 
finding that the defendant perjured himself, a fortiori, the 
court can impose a higher sentence within the sentencing range 
based on a finding of perjury.  The district court, having found 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's decision to adjust Bass' sentence upward four levels 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and to sentence at the top of the range 
based on the court's finding that Bass perjured himself.  
However, because the 1989 guidelines, as we interpreted them in 
United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1989), do not permit 
an additional upward departure based on the foreseeable use of 
the firearms purchased by Bass in the commission of felonies, we 
will vacate the district court's sentence and remand for 
resentencing consistent with the foregoing opinion. 
